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KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
THE CONSTUTUTIONAL LITIGATION ON
ASSISTED SUICIDE: A LAST LOOK BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES
MICHAEL S. POPKIN*

Thank you for the opportunity to address you here today. As
you know, Attorney General Vacco has been personally involved
in this matter, not only with a strong personal commitment to it
as a matter of policy, but to the point of being willing to shut
down his own schedule for three months to prepare for and to argue this case before the Supreme Court of the United States. 1
Currently, there are two physician-assisted suicide cases before
the Supreme Court, Quill v. Vacco, 2 which we have defended
from its inception, 3 and Washington v. Glucksberg.4 For the law
students in the audience, let me begin by saying that this was
the case of a lifetime. It was a case of pure constitutional law involving issues of public policy divorced from issues of money. 5 By
contrast, there are major issues involved, for instance, in suing
* B.A., J.D., Boston University. Mr. Popkin has served as Assistant Attorney General
for the State of New York since 1993. He also served as Assistant Attorney General for the
State of Maine from 1989 until 1992, and was in private practice in that state from 197889. From its inception, Mr. Popkin has had primary responsibility for Quill v. Vacco, arguing the case before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
and before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. He was on the brief
on the case before the United States Supreme Court.
1 See Oral Argument, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858) available in
1997 WL 13672, at 1. Before the U.S. Supreme Court on January 8, 1997, Attorney General Vacco argued that New York statutes prohibiting assisted suicide did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under the federal Constitution. Id.
at *1.
2 Quill v. Vacc, 80 F.3d 716, 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
3 Quill v. Kopell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
4 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
5 Editorial Note: Subsequent to Mr. Popkin's speech, the Supreme Court found that
although the line between refusing life saving medical treatment and assisted suicide could
be unclear, the distinction between assisting suicide and the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment was nonetheless permissible under New York law. Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct.
2293, 2298 (1997).
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the tobacco companies 6 that revolve around public health as
well. 7 But money and politics are mixed up in them in such a
way that the cases of assisted suicide have simply avoided.
This is constitutional law at its best. A career in government
law, or at least part of a career in government law, is one of the
few places you would ever get a chance to do this. You really
cannot practice constitutional law in private practice. You might
get a case once in a while. You might be able to teach it, and
that is primarily where the plaintiffs bar comes from in these
cases, and what they draw upon. But constitutional law is
mainly government law. It is the law of the citizen vis-A-vis the
government and what the limits of the law are. Practicing law in
a public agency and representing a government is one of the
places where you get to do it at its best.
Now, from the title of this particular presentation, you might
gather that I think that this is a good moment to look back for
the last time. This may really be the last chance we will have to
8
examine these cases before the Court decides them. Once the
Court decides them, I expect that the decisions themselves will
be the focus of all future discussion, even to the point of over9
shadowing the down-to-earth issues and concerns of its litigants.
People will look back on Quill in future years and talk about
what the Court did with the case. 10 I doubt, however, that anyone will be particularly interested with how it was viewed by the
litigants and what their strategies were. Therefore, this is a good
6 See, e.g., Kurzweil v. Philip Morris Co., Inc., Docket Nos. 94 Civ. 2373 & 94 Civ. 9546,
1997 WL 167043, at * 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting President Clinton's characterization of
nicotine as "addictive"); Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 360-62 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (noting New York legislature's funding of research commission to investigate smoking issues).
7 See Sackman, 920 F. Supp. at 365 (holding that compelling need to protect public
health justified disclosure of confidentially prepared legal documents).
8 Quill, 80 F.3d 716, 716 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding New York's statute prohibiting assisted suicide violated Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause), rev'd 117 S. Ct.
2293 (1997); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 790 (declaring Due Process
clause of Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual's decision to hasten their death
and that Washington's statute outlawing physician-assisted suicide violative of this protected liberty interest), rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997).
9 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 718. Terminally-ill, mentally competent plaintiffs asserted they
were unconstitutionally deterred from obtaining prescribed lethal medication. Id.; Compassion, 79 F.3d at 793. Plaintiffs claimed Washington's prohibition against causing or
aiding another to commit suicide violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
10 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). Quill was decided on June 26, 1997, subsequent to Mr. Popkin's speech. Id. Rejecting plaintiff-respondents claims, the Supreme Court determined
that New York's statutes prohibiting the assistance of another to commit suicide were not
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause. Id. at 2296.
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moment to look back, before the Court decides the case, to consider differing points of view. Also, for the lawyers involved, once
the case is argued and submitted, it is for all practical purposes
over. We will read the decision, but I do not expect that there
will be much to do on this subject again. Justice Frankfurter, I
think, once likened a lawyer's mind to a tub of water that is filled
up with one case and then drained and then filled up again. If
that is a good simile, then this may be a good moment to take
one last look at that water before it drains away.
Now, a few basic things about the case occur to me. One is
that, judicially, it proved almost impossible to handicap this
case. 1 Cases about whether there is a right to assistance in suicide really cut across every spectrum that you can create to classify what points of view exist. Politically, you cannot say that
there is a Republican or a Democratic point of view about
whether there ought to be a constitutional right, or even a statutory right, to physician-assisted suicide. 12 One would have
thought that Democrats would have been generally in favor of
establishing this right. Then I read in the Village Voice that Nat
Hentoff is bashing the assisted suicide movement, 13 and I decided that that is really not true. Likewise, there is not really a
liberal or a conservative point of view on this subject. There is a
11 See Quill v. Kopell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 79-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Upon filing the complaint, plaintiffs moved to enjoin the operation of the relevant statutes barring the assistance of others to commit suicide. Id. Defendants promptly opposed the motion and crossmoved for a judgment on the pleadings to dismiss the action. Id. The Court denied plaintiffs' motion and dismissed the action on defendants' cross-motion, and plaintiffs appealed.
Id. On appeal to the Second Circuit, defendants claimed that the action in question did not
present a justiciable controversy, and that plaintiffs did not have standing as none of them
was under any threat of prosecution. Quill, 80 F.3d at 722-23. The Second Circuit rejected
these defendants' claims, and held that the distinction made by New York statutes, allowing for termination of life-support on one hand, yet depriving terminally-ill competent
adults of the choice to be prescribed death-hastening drugs on the other, had no rational
basis and therefore violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 727.
12 See House Votes to Bar Funding for Illegal Assisted Suicide, PANTAGRAPH, Apr. 4,
1997, at A6, available in 1997 WL 2468530 (noting that rare and unlikely political unity
was forged between Congressional Democrats and Republicans in passage of bar to federal
funding for assisted suicides to pre-empt potential Supreme Court ruling declaring antiassisted suicide legislation unconstitutional); see also CMDS Doctors Available for Comment on Supreme Court's Physician-Assisted Suicide Landmark Ruling, PR NEWSWIRE,
June 25, 1997 (describing intense national debate surrounding physician-assisted suicide).
13 See Nat Hentoff, We Hear the Death Train Coming: Every One of Us Faces this Issue-Young and Old, Male and Female, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 4, 1997, at 12, available in
1997 WL 7917317 (drawing unsettling analogy between 1933 New York Times headline
praising German Ministry of Justice for legalization of "mercy killings" implemented "in
the interests of true humanity,' and pending outcome of Quill and Compassion in Dying
cases).
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strong libertarian streak on the right of the policy spectrum that
wants this right. 14 People of all walks of life and all denominaover it. And
tions are very ambivalent about it and very divided
15
scholars.
constitutional
for
the same thing goes
One would have thought that strict constructionists or broad
constructionists would have taken polarized positions, but that
really was not true either. Rather, one can find scholars, as well
as writers and judges, on either side of the spectrum with deeply
divided views on this subject. All you have to look at is the fact
that the Second Circuit's opinion affirming this right was
authored by Judge Roger Miner,16 and Judge Steven Rheinhart
authored the Ninth Circuit opinion. 1 7 Indeed, this may be the
only issue in the entire legal spectrum on which Judges Miner
and Rheinhart would agree.
Another thing that strikes me, that immediately struck us all
when we got the case, is that it really should have been, as 18a
matter of constitutional law, a slam dunk winner for the states.
These are not particularly complicated cases as a matter of law.
First, looking at the issues, there are few precedents to work
with. There was the Cruzan'9 decision and the abortion juris14 See, e.g., Katherina E. Gonzalez, Letter, Pro-Choice, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 1, 1997,
at 6, available in 1997 WL 7918024. Directly criticizing Nat Hentoffs article, We Hear the
Death Train Coming, Gonzalez recounts her nineteen-year battle with terminal illness and
the significance of mentally competent, terminally-ill individuals retaining the right to end
their own suffering without the State's interference. Id.
15 See Nat Hentoff, Death's Enemy: Yale Kamisar: Should a Permanently Bedridden,
Cancerous Old Man Be Kept Alive?, VILLAGE VOICE, May 28, 1996, at 10, available in 1996
WL 5616727. Hentoff criticizes Michigan constitutional law professor, Yale Kamisarrenowned as an expert in the areas of privacy, assisted suicide and euthanasia-for venerating the "seductive dangers of our national attraction to death as a form of medical treatment. .... " Id.
16 Quill, 80 F.3d at 716.
17 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub
nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (holding that statute prohibiting
assisted suicide violated due process rights of terminally-ill patients).
18 See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997). Mr. Popkin's prediction was confirmed by the Supreme Court's reversal in Vacco v.
Quill, and Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), effectively leaving it to each
individual state's discretion whether or not to prohibit acts of assisted suicide or physicianassisted suicide. Id.; People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. den., Kevorkian v. Michigan, 514 U.S. 1083 (1995). Another indicator foreshadowing this result may
be inferred by the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in People v. Kevorkian. Id. By denying certiorari in Kevorkian, arguably, the Supreme Court sent the implied message to
Michigan and other states that the Kevorkianlphysician-assisted suicide issue was best left
to the states to resolve in keeping with their respective public policies. See id.
19 Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (holding that principle
that competent person has constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment could be inferred from Court's prior decisions).
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prudence. 20 Cruzan drew from a line of cases dealing with the
right to refuse medical treatment, 2 1 which arose in the State
courts. But it was not a particularly complex area of the law, as
compared to, for example, antitrust law, where you would have
to go out and master huge areas of doctrine. Here, there were
really only two or three major cases that you had to reason from
and apply. It was not the sort of thing you had to spend weeks
studying. The issues were fairly clear cut.
The same thing was true of the record in Quill,22 which was
not a factually complex case. The plaintiffs filed some affidavits,
and while the inferences that you could draw from the affidavits
were disputed, the facts in the affidavits were never in dispute,
so that the case was simple as a matter of record. Our Supreme
Court record is an inch and a half thick, and it is something that
you could read in a couple of hours. 23 Most of the pleadings just
repeat themselves, and three or four are amended complaints.
There is not much in there that you could not master in half a
day. What is incredibly complex is the medical literature on the
subject, the policy arguments, and the implications that everybody wants to draw one way or the other. 24 When you look at the
Supreme Court briefs, you find that the parties are essentially
relying on the same literature and the same facts. 25 However,
20 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (holding that right to privacy encompasses right to abortion, although right is not absolute); see also Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,
446 (1977) (reiterating that state interest in pregnancy becomes compelling at viability).
21 See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905) (balancing individual's liberty interest in refusing smallpox vaccine against state interest to prevent smallpox epidemic); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 591 (D.R.I. 1988) (allowing for removal of
feeding tube of woman in persistent vegetative state); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 947
(Me. 1987) (concluding that comatose patient who previously indicated his desire not be
kept alive on life support, had a right to have life sustaining medical procedures discontinued); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 445 (Wash. 1987) (holding that patient has right to remove
or withhold life sustaining medical treatment).
22 See Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2293.
23 See Petitioners' Brief, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858) available
in 1996 WL 656345 (citing Attorney General's arguments for permitting ban on assisted
suicide in New York).
24 See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, A Critique of Family Members as
Proxy Decisionmakers Without Legal Limits, 12 ISSUES L. & MED. 133, 133, 165 (1996)
(criticizing common practice of according family members "proxy decision-making rights
without guidelines"). But see Susan D. Block & Andrew Billings, Patient Requests for
Euthanasiaand Assisted Suicide in Terminal Illness, 36 PSYCHOSOMATICS 445, 461 (1995)
(contending that 10% of terminally ill patients express desire for early death and that in
late stage of illness, depression and suicide increase significantly).
25 See, e.g., Respondents' Brief at *41-42, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 951858) available in 1996 WL 708912, citing van der Maas, et al., Euthanasia,PhysicianAssisted Suicide, and Other Medical PracticesInvolving the End of Life in the Netherlands,
335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1699 (1996), at *44, 48, citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982),
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they spin their arguments in widely different directions from the
same materials. 2 6 What I draw from that is the fact that you
have an incredibly complex issue of policy, but not one that involves issues of disputed adjudicative fact. Instead, it is an issue
that revolves around what, as a matter of public policy, one does
in such situations.
Now, saying that it was a slam dunk winner, what I mean is
27
that there was an issue of substantive due process and another
28 The issue is best framed as a matter of subof equal protection.
stantive due process. Under the methodology embraced by every
29
Supreme Court decision since and including Roe v. Wade, in order for a substantive due process right to be recognized, the right
in question must be firmly imbedded in our history and traditions, or fundamental to the concept of ordered liberty as we understand it.30 It should have been a slam dunk winner because it
is hard to see how any activity currently outlawed by forty-nine
states, 3 1 always outlawed by the common law, 32 and offensive to
citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). But see, e.g., Petitioner's Brief at *24, Quill (No. 95-1858) citing van der Maas, et al., Euthanasiaand
Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life, 338 LANCET 669 (1991), citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261, at *8, citingPlyler, 457 U.S. 202.
26 See Petitioner's Reply Brief at *22, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 951858) available in 1996 WL 739259. Two main components of petitioners' argument were
that substantive due process did not encompass a fundamental right to physician-assisted
suicide and that New York's prohibition of assisted suicide was a permissible means of effectuating a legitimate interest. Id. at *3. But see Petitioner's Brief at *22, Quill (No. 951858). Contrarily, the heart of respondents' argument was that in fact the Supreme Court
had articulated "a principled approach for defining the liberty protected under the Fourteenth Amendment," and that the lines drawn by New York violated the Equal Protection
Clause. Id.
27 See Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2297 (holding that since New York's statutes prohibiting
assisted suicide do not infringe upon fundamental rights nor involve suspect classifications, they were presumptively valid).
28 Id. at 2298 (upholding distinction between assisting suicide and withdrawing lifesustaining treatment).
29 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973)(declaring Texas criminal abortion statutes unconstitutional).
30 Id. at 152. One such fundamental right, which is "imbedded in our history and traditions," and recognized by the Court as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," is the
right of privacy. Id.
31 See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-10 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.080(a), (f) (Michie 1996);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3210 (West 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-13-905(a), (f), 20-17210(a), (g) (Michie 1991 and Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7191.5(a), (g)
(West Supp. 1997); CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 4723 (West Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. §§
15-14-504(4), 15-18-112(1), 15-18.5-101(3), 15-18.6-1008 (1987 and Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 19a-575 ( Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN., Tit. 16, § 2512 (Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 6-2430, 21-2122 (1995 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. §§ 765-309(1), (2) (Supp. 1996);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-11(b), 31-36-2(b) (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-13 (1996); IDAHO
CODE § 39-152 (Supp. 1996); ILL. COMP. STAT., ch. 755, §§ 35-9(f). 40/5, 40/50, 45/2-1 (West
1992); IND. CODE §§ 16-36-1-13, 16-36-4-19, 30-5-5-17 (1994 & Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE §§
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the established ethics of the medical profession itself33 could
possibly meet the criteria for substantive due process. Of course,
4
3
we were proven wrong.

At first blush, to us it seemed that, as a matter of equal protection, the plaintiffs' case had even less merit. Under the traditional equal protection analysis one need only establish that
there is a reasonable basis for a legislature to distinguish between two activities. 35 That is the end of the inquiry. It is a relaxed analysis, and once you establish that, you win. There
seemed to be fairly obvious differences historically and medically, 36 between declining medical treatment, 3 7 or allowing doc-

144A.11.1-144A.11.6, 144B.12.2 (1997); KAN STAT. ANN. § 65-28-109 (995); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 311.638 (Banks-Baldwin 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 40, §§ 1299.58.10(A), (B) (West
1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS 201D, § 12 (1997); MD. CODE HEALTH ANN. § 5-611(c) (1994); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 18-A, Nl 5-813(b), (c) (West Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
700.496(2) (West 1995); MINN. STAT. §§ 145B.14, 145C.14 (Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 41-41-117(2), 41-41-119(1) (Supp. 1992); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 459.015.3, 459.044(5) (1992);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-205(1), (7), 50-10-104(1), (6) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20412(1), (7), 30-3401(3) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.670 (2) (1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 137-H: 10; 137-H: 13, 173-J:1 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-54 (d), (e), 26:2H-77 (West
1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-13B(1), (C) (Michie Supp. 1995); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2989 (McKinney 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320(b), 90-321(f) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
23-06.4-01, 23-06.5.01 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.12(A), (D) (Anderson Supp.
1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 63, §§ 3101.2(C), 3101.12(a), (G) (West 1996); 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5402(b) (Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10-9(a), (f), 23-4.11-10(a), (f) (1996);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-130, 44-78-50(A), (C), 62-5-504(0) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-12(D)-14, 34-12(D)-20 (Michie 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11110(a), 39-13-216 (Supp. 1995); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 672-017, 672-020,
672-021 (West 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1116, 75-2-1118 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN., tit.
18, § 5260 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-.1-2990 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV. CODE §§
70.122.070(1), 70.122.100 (Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-10, 16-30A-16(a), 16-30B2(b), 16-30B-13, 16-30C-14 (1996); WIS. STAT. §§ 154.11(1), (6), 154-25(&), 155.70(7) (Supp.
1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-5-211, 35-22-109, 35-22-208 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996).
32 See Peter G. Daniels, An Illinois Physician-AssistedSuicide Act: A Merciful End to a
Terminally Ill Criminal Tradition,28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 763, 764 (1996) (tracing treatment
of suicide as criminal act originating in medieval England, endured in American colonies,
and now law of most states).
33 See Janet Firshein, U.S. Medics Oppose Physician Assisted Suicide, 348 LANCET
1439, 1349 (Nov. 23, 1996) (noting AMA is likely to forever officially oppose physicianassisted suicide). But see Cheryl K. Smith, What About Legalized Assisted Suicide?, 8
ISSUES L. & MED. 503, 512 (1993) (wondering if Hippocratic Oath, directing physicians to
eliminate suffering, justifies physician-assisted suicide as means of relieving extreme suffering); Thomas A. Preston, Physician Involvement in Life-Ending Practices, 18 PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 531, 767 (1995) (noting "double effect" of prescribing lethal dose to alleviate
pain has been justified when actor's intention was good).
34 See generally Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293
(1997) (holding New York's prohibition on suicide assistance was constitutional).
35 See United States R.R. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1981) (noting states do not
violate Equal Protection Clause merely because classifications made by its laws are imperfect).
36 See Daniels, supranote 33, at 764.
37 See Firshein, supranote 34, at 1439; Preston, supra note 34, at 767.
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38
tors to assist in the withdrawal of medical treatment, or allowing them to actively inject death-causing agents into their patients. 39 As long as a reasonable person could view them differently, that should have ended it. So, that was the way we saw
the case.

Also, to the degree that plaintiffs argument relied on the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence, using it as a springboard
40
in seeking to establish this new constitutional right, people
4 1 with its strong emphasis
viewed Planned Parenthoodv. Casey,
on stare decisis and on the institutional integrity of the Court, as
intended to offer a springboard for a wide expansion of substantive due process rights. I do not think many legal scholars expected that was what Quill4 2 was all about. From all those points
of view, we therefore believed we had a winner, and that was the
way it proved in the district court. 4 3 We made legal arguments
along the grounds I have just outlined. Plaintiffs put in a great
many affidavits full of the most difficult to read stories of death
and disease, and full of imagery of human suffering at its worstat the end of life." But Judge Griesa was willing to take the law
and apply it. 4 5 He never got into their affidavits and, therefore,
38 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 261 (1990)
(discussing right to terminate medical treatment).
39 See People v. Kevorkian, 534 N.W.2d 172, 172 (Mich. App. 1995) (holding that state
can enjoin physician from assisting patient to commit suicide).
40 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973) (describing fundamental right of privacy);
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759
(1986) (holding that there exists a right to decide whether to terminate pregnancy), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833 (1992)
(establishing parameters for which state may interfere in women's right to terminate
pregnancy); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 419-420
(1983) (defining limits on state power to regulate abortion), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
41 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. In a partial reversal, via the elimination of the trimester
standard developed by Justice Blackmun under Roe, the Casey Court held that, as it relates to abortions, 'the line should be drawn at viability, so that before that time the
woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 869.
42 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293.
43 Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (upholding statute prohibiting
assisted suicide).
44 See, e.g., Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 84. The crux of plaintiffs' arguments on appeal before the Second Circuit was that they should prevail under the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. The logic of plaintiffs' reasoning was drawn from New York precedent allowing for the
refusal of life-sustaining treatment, even where that refusal would result in certain death.
Id. Plaintiffs then made the next logical leap to argue that any such refusal is also legally
analogous to having a doctor prescribe a fatal dose of medication to a person who is terminally ill, thus resulting in the death of that person. Id.
45 Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 85 (holding that plaintiffs had not demonstrated that New
York laws barring physician-assisted suicide violated Fourteenth Amendment Equal Pro-
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reaching the result was fairly simple.
This, however, immediately generates several questions. First,
why these cases, won by the plaintiffs in both the Second and the
Ninth Circuits, 46 were not slam dunk winners. By ending up before the Supreme Court, how had we been proven wrong? The
answers, I think, in part, were that these actions represent legal
cries for mercy on a case-by-case basis. What I found is that if
you discussed this with people, they saw it not as a matter of legal methodology, nor as a matter of public policy, nor as a systemic medical or social issue. Rather, they would personalize it
and, not surprisingly, take that image of horrible suffering, of a
person crying out for relief, and identify with it. They then
would very naturally want that same measure of decisionmaking autonomy for themselves. 4 7 They identify with it, in a
"seat of the pants" kind of way, they think that this is something
that ought to be enshrined in the law, and they find it quite irrelevant whether a court does it or it is accomplished through an
electoral campaign. Those issues are more legal and, of course,
have profound significance. A constitutional right, after all, is
something for the ages. Contrastly, a legislature may well decide
to enact a law permitting physician-assisted suicides, later repeal
it, or get some feedback on it and later alter its approach to it.
But the public is not terribly impressed by this distinction and I
do not think that the person in the street is terribly wrong in this
regard. It is a distinction that is not terribly important to them,
although it has profound constitutional significance.
The genius, therefore, of plaintiffs' presentation of their cases,
was in presenting those affidavits to the Court, quoting them in
their briefs, and putting that image of the horribly suffering person at the end of their life directly before the judges. This did not
do plaintiffs much good in the district court, but it worked well in
the Second and Ninth Circuits. That is, the plaintiffs invited
tection Clause).
46 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 716 (holding statute prohibiting assisted suicide unconstitutional); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding statute prohibiting assisted suicide unconstitutional), rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997).
47 See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 130, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914) (reasoning that all competent adults have right to determine what shall be done
with their own bodies); c.f N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (1) (defining lack of informed consent as failure of person providing professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose alternatives, reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits to patient).
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judges who, after all, are people accustomed to exerting a lot of
control over circumstances and over their own lives, to identify
with them. Thus, they invited them to reach a result-oriented
decision that would establish this as a matter of law. The affidavits filed by the plaintiffs were truly difficult to read. If any of
us want to talk about this issue, or make this decision without
looking squarely at the suffering involved, I think we are probably not going about it in the right way. But I do not believe, of
establishing what the plaincourse, that this approach justifies
48
tiffs urge as a constitutional right.
The equal protection argument that plaintiffs made, which ultimately succeeded in the Second Circuit, 4 9 was also logically sophisticated. The plaintiffs' approached the issue historically.
Historically, the law has allowed physicians, their patients and
the public at large, to decline medical treatment. 5 0 The common
law basically established that a physician could not touch you
without your consent, or it would be a battery. 5 1 As a result, this
line of cases was finally pushed to its extreme by the Supreme
Court in Cruzan,5 2 drawing from the nearly unanimous precedent around the United States variously culled from the highest
state courts. Such precedent meant that, even if declining medical treatment would result in your death, you still had the right
to say "no" to that treatment. 53 Historically, this also tended to
establish a certain amount of autonomy among individuals in the
face of powerful and overwhelming medical therapies. 54 Importantly, that line of cases grew, not out of some desire to establish
a right to die, but out of an ever-increasing desire for the law to
48 See Quill v. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1997) (finding that New York's statutes
outlawing assisted suicide were valid as they did not infringe fundamental rights nor involve suspect classifications).
49 Quill, 80 F.3d at 727. The Second Circuit opinion, authored by Justice Miner, held
that "to the extent that the statutes in question prohibit persons in the final stages of
terminal illness from having assistance in ending their lives by use of self-administered,
prescribed drugs, the statutes lack any rational basis and are violative of the Equal Protection Clause.' Id.
50 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (inferring
from prior Court decisions that competent person has constitutionally protected liberty
interest to refuse unwanted medical treatment).
51 See, e.g., Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 92 (holding doctor who operated without patient
consent committed assault).
52 497 U.S. 261.
53 See id. at 262 (assuming that competent persons have constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving treatment).
54 See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1996)
(explaining need for autonomous decision-making with respect to medical treatment).
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recognize that no one should be hooked up to a machine against
their will. 55

Hence, as medical therapies became more and more overwhelming and intrusive, the need for a legal doctrine which
would establish an individual's right to say "no" to those therapies was equally pressing. 56 An interesting aspect to these cases
is that they do not necessarily pit the state against the individual
with respect to those medical therapies. More often, these cases
will involve a hospital and an individual fighting over whether
the hospital can impose the therapy on the individual or whether
it must respect the individual's or the surrogate's wishes to de57
cline the treatment.
Plaintiffs sought to blur the line between saying "no" and the
line between administering drugs actively to cause death.58 They
accomplished this by taking advantage of the fact that in some
extreme cases, declining medical treatment is virtually indistinguishable from taking positive steps to end life. 59 You can posit a
few difficult hypotheticals where someone is hooked up to a respirator and pulling the plug on that respirator would result in
nearly instantaneous death. They pointed out that the act of
pulling that plug could be equally well described as an act of
killing the patient, an act of simply respecting the patient's
wishes to decline medical treatment. 60 Intellectually and epistemologically, what they did in effect, was to get right on the
line, right up close to it, in the same sense as if you were to get
right up close to newsprint, the dots making up the letters would
virtually disappear. All you would see at such close range would
55 See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) (providing basis for later decisions concerning rights of patients to refuse unwanted medical treatments).
56 See, e.g., Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, 148 A.D.2d 244, 253, 544 N.Y.S. 2d
840, 846, (2d Dep't 1989) (granting permission to remove patient's life support after proving her clear intent to bind others to effectuate her desires in future).
57 See, e.g., In re Scott Matthews v. Mental Hygiene Legal Servs., 225 A.D.2d 142, 142,
650 N.Y.S.2d 373, 373 (3d Dep't 1996) (holding that "in cases where there is a division of
medical opinion as to the appropriate treatment for a life-threatening condition, deference
should be given to the decision of the parents as long as the chosen course of treatment is a
reasonable one within medical standards').
58 See Respondent's Brief at *45 (stating that distinction between refusing medical
treatment and assisted suicide was unfounded).
59 See id. (maintaining that legal distinction does not depend on any difference in actual intent between those patients whom doctors are permitted to assist to die and those
whom they are not).
60 See id. at *48-49 (further arguing that New York's distinction between those who
are on life support and those who are not renders ban on physicians provision of simple,
life-ending prescriptions to identically situated patients utterly irrational).
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be a pattern of dots. Then you would say, as plaintiffs said:
"Look, there is no line here. Because you are already permitting
this activity, you have conceded that you have no interest in
prohibiting it. There is nothing involved in this alleged distinc-

tion but hypocrisy."
It seems to us that the old famous aphorism of Learned Hand
should have been sufficient to refute the foregoing reasoning,
specifically that just because there is a moment when the sun
rises, when one can not tell day from night, does not mean that
there are no such things as darkness or light. The fact that there
are a few difficult cases on the edge does not mean that the distinction is meaningless. Plaintiffs, however, presented that issue
very well. 6 1 In the Ninth Circuit, Judge Rheinhart agreed with
their due process arguments. 6 2 He saw the issue as a matter of
personal autonomy and carved out a right to commit physicianassisted suicide out of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
63
Amendment.

Judge Rheinhart, however, very candidly recognized that he
could not limit the right in the way plaintiffs were presenting it.
He thus recognized a general right to control the time and manner of one's own death. 6 4 Meanwhile, in the Second Circuit, in an
opinion that I view as somewhat more intellectually dishonest,
65
Judge Miner relied upon the same equal protection argument.
My view of why that happened was that Judge Calabresi was
61 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 718 (2d Cir. 1996) (arguing that New York statutes
were invalid because they prohibited physicians from acceding to their terminally ill, mentally competent patients' requests for help in hastening death), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293
(1997).
62 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d. 790, 837 (reasoning that Washington statute violated Due Process as it applied to terminally-ini persons wishing to hasten
their deaths through prescriptions issued by their physicians), rev'd sub nom., Washington
v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
63 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 837 (holding that liberty interest of terminally-ill patient seeking to hasten death through prescribed medication, outweighed concurrent state
interests to preserve person's life by preventing suicide).
64 See id. at 816 (recognizing that some prohibitory and regulatory state action is justified and fully consistent with constitutional principles).
65 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 727. The court concluded that: 1) the statutes in question fall
within category of social welfare legislation and therefore are subject to rational basis
scrutiny upon judicial review; 2) New York law does not treat equally all competent persons who are in final stages of fatal illness and wish to hasten their deaths; 3) distinctions
made by New York law with regard to such persons do not further any legitimate state
purpose; 4) accordingly, to extent that statutes in question prohibit persons in final stages
of terminal illness from having assistance in ending their lives by use of self-administered,
prescribed drugs, statutes lack any rational basis and are violative of Equal Protection
Clause. Id.
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basically off in one direction with his idea of a "constitutional remand," which was something he had written about while he was
Dean of Yale Law School. 66 Judging from the opinion he wrote
and from his questions at oral argument, Judge Calabresi was
committed for that position from the outset. The rest of the
panel consisted of Judges Miner and Pollack. Of these two,
Judge Miner came into the argument equally committed to the
plaintiffs' result. He wanted to recognize this right; he had, however, Judge Pollack to deal with. Judging from questions, Judge
Pollack was skeptical of the plaintiffs' case. The problem for
Judge Miner, therefore, was that to achieve any majority one
way or the other, he had to get Judge Pollack to sign his opinion,
as Judge Calabresi was "stuck" on constitutional remand. 67
I thus believe that the Second Circuit's opinion which first held
that there was no substantive Due Process right to assisted suicide but when went "in the back door" by recognizing the right as
a matter of Equal Protection, represents a compromise between
Judges Miner and Pollack. For Judge Miner to get a majority, he
had to make a deal with Judge Pollack. The holding that there
was no Due Process right was the price Judge Miner may have
paid to get Judge Pollack to sign onto his opinion. The interesting thing about the Second Circuit's opinion, of course, is that
there was no need to deal with the Due Process issue at all. The
court could have simply made an Equal Protection holding. This
is the kind of speculation that lawyers love, but ultimately is
unanswerable. We will probably never know unless someone
writes a memoir.
People have a very hard time with this issue. Even judges who
are faced with it seem to need something more persuasive than
just dry law before they give the results to one side or the other.
If that is correct, it is also necessary to view the coming argument in the Supreme Court with this in mind to understand that
our mistake below was leaving the policy debate completely up to
the plaintiffs, and opposing it with purely legal arguments.
Therefore, when briefing those cases for the Supreme Court, it
became necessary to join the policy issues, as the plaintiffs had
done, with the hope that if we could at least fight it to a draw, we
66 See id. at 742 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (explaining that "constitutional remand' is
necessary to decide ultimate validity of statute).
67 See id. at 738-39 (discussing constitutional remand).
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would win the cases. If the Supreme Court were to end up in a
position where there were equally good policy arguments and
equally good consequentialist arguments on either side, they
would not be institutionally in a position to resolve the physicianassisted suicide debate. Our mistake below was believing that
by merely having the law on our side, and by merely being able
to cite to persuasive existing Supreme Court doctrine, we would
win the physician-assisted suicide cases. This was not just a legal tactic; it dovetailed with a fundamental truth about the
cases. The problem with using the courts to resolve the physician-assisted suicide debate is that they have no particular insti6s
tutional competence to resolve a debate involving the issue.
These physician-assisted suicide cases are not particularly
complex factually or legally, but are incredibly complex as a matter of policy. Each side cited what is happening in the Netherlands, or quoted reports by critical care nurses and by physicians
about what happens at the end of life. 6 9 But both sides spin
completely different arguments and conclusions out of these
"facts." Hence, what you are really asking the court to do is to
resolve the debate, not with a legal lodestar to look at, but as a
matter of policy. The point is that the choices involved are not
truly legal issues. The choices involved in physician-assisted
suicide are political ones, involving policy choices, as to which
risks and consequences are more acceptable to society at large.
Judges need to look to the law as a source of settled authority if
they are to exercise legitimate power, which is Justice Cardozo's
classic model of the judicial process. 70 They simply cannot decide
cases based on their own preferences. Therefore, they are no
more equipped to resolve this debate than are the rest of us.
Viewed from this perspective, the conclusion becomes nearly
inescapable: The ultimate resolution of the physician-assisted
suicide issue belongs in the legislative process and not in the
courts. As it turns out, this was very well illustrated in the oral
68 See Petitioner's Reply Brief at *1, Quill (No. 95-1858) (arguing that substantive
component of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does not encompass fundamental right to obtain assistance of physician in committing suicide).
69 Quill v. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2310 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that
outcome of other cases will not necessarily be resolved by Quill, but may instead be decided on their specific facts).
70 See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 104 (1934) (holding that Massachusetts
was free to regulate its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy and fairness,
unless it offends some principle of fundamental justice).
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argument before the Supreme Court. 71 There was an exchange
between Laurence Tribe and Justice Kennedy 72 where Laurence
Tribe was indulging in this "trashing" of the line between active
killing and the withdrawal of medical treatment 73 and made the
comment that if the States are laboratories, as in Justice Brandeis' famous formulation, 74 than those laboratories are operating
with the lights out. Justice Scalia then interposed: "[Was] there
75
any reason to believe that we have any more light?"

Now, if you read the Supreme Court briefs, you will see that
this policy debate was well articulated by the State. 76 Our understanding was that if the Court was thinking about nothing
but the horrible suffering of the individual plaintiffs, it was not
thinking about what the State needed it to be thinking about in
order to win the case. 77 In a case which depends on the legislative ability to draw competing lines in a policy area, you need to
articulate the policy debate well and show how the lines are distinctly drawn. Also important to this end were the amicus briefs
and submissions. These briefs demonstrated that the major
medical associations, the American Suicide Foundation and other
78
organizations favored maintenance of the line as it exists.
Viewed from this perspective, I am very satisfied with our briefing, and with Washington State's briefing. We put forward our
best case.
Interestingly, by the time it reached the Supreme Court, this
approach seemed to highlight two very strong vulnerabilities in
the plaintiffs' cases, which I was surprised to see were not taken
71 See Respondent's Brief at *42, Quill (No. 95-1858) (noting that Petitioners' claims
about Netherlands lack any evidence that physician-assisted suicide actually led to any
increase in involuntary euthanasia by doctors); Petitioner's Brief at *248, Quill (No. 951858) (claiming that some Dutch physicians practice nonvoluntary euthanasia, despite its
illegality).
72 See generally Oral Argument at *1, Quill (No. 95-1858).
73 See id. at *40-42 (blurring distinctions between assisted suicide and dying from

natural causes).
74 See id. At one point during Mr. Tribe's argument, Justice Kennedy retorted:
Well, Mr. Tribe, if we go into this sort of intricate analysis of state law in order-in accepting [your fine line distinctions]-we won't be deciding any case except New York's
here. We would have to make the same analysis [separately] for 49 other states.
Id.
75 See id. at *43 (asserting states are like 50 different laboratories).
76 See id. at *46 (asking rhetorically whether legislatures working in dark will take
into account everyone's interests).
77 See generally Petitioner's Brief at * 1, Quill (No. 95-1858).
78 See id. at *30 (arguing that forcing unwanted medical treatment on people is tantamount to enslaving them via tubes and invasive machinery).
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up more forcefully below. As I have indicated, the strength of the
plaintiffs case was the invitation for the judges to identify with
the images of the horrific suffering of these patients, and their
cry to the courts for mercy in these individual instances. Their
weakness, however, always was the danger that any right to
79
physician-assisted suicide, once recognized, would be abused.
The idea is that mercy killing can not be confined to just a few
sympathetic cases, but will inevitably become widespread and in80
stitutionalized as to require administration by a bureaucracy.

Anyone who has dealt with the existing medical bureaucracy
would not welcome such a development. This was the argument
that I think eventually convinced the New York State Task Force
to reject the entitlement to such a right, 8 1 although, ethically,
some of its members felt that the need for mercy in particular
cases was very strong.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs tried to deal with this very artfully.
They always argued that this was a very limited right that could
be established only for people on their deathbed who were compe-

tent, and who were suffering horribly at the end stage of their
life. 82 This attempted to draw the sting out of the argument that
there was a vast potential for abuse.
There was always, however, some intellectual dishonesty at
the heart of this argument and this came back to haunt them before the Supreme Court because while you can successfully ar79 See Brief Amid Curiae of Gary Lee, M.D. et al. in Support of Petitioners at *1,
Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858) and Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110) available in 1996 WL 647921 (concluding that depression
makes terminal patients highly susceptible to undue influence that their lives are not
worth living); see also Brief Amici Curiae of Americans for Death with Dignity et al. in
Support of Respondents at "1, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858) and
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110) available in 1996 WL
709335 (expressing belief that that competent, terminally-ill adult has right to choose
peaceful, pain-free, dignified death).
80 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Aguduth Israel of America et al. in Support of Petitioners, at *4 Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858) and Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110) available in 1996 WL 752720 (ruefully
noting similarity between arguments justifying "mass slaughter of millions of human beings deemed physically or racially 'inferior,'" and arguments justifying physician-assisted
suicide).
81 See Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician Assisted Suicide: Creatinga Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1996) (discussing
why successful regulation of physician-assisted suicide would be impossible to implement,
both in principle and in practice).
82 Linda C. Fentiman, Law and Ethics at the End of Life: High Court Speaks, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 25, 1997, at 5 (reporting it is unlikely that New York legislature will legalize physician-assisted suicide without endorsement from its Task Force on Life and the Law).
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ticulate positions before the Supreme Court which might be politically unpopular, 83 you cannot be intellectually dishonest
about your case before the Supreme Court. This was the problem with the plaintiffs' argument. 84
First, plaintiffs' argument that physician-assisted suicide could
be limited to just a few people on their deathbed really is inconsistent with general, fundamental constitutional rights doctrine.
The Supreme Court focused its questioning on one problem: "If
this really is a fundamental right, if it is a liberty that everyone
enjoys, how is it that there are only twelve people in the United
States today who can really exercise it?" 8 5 On this point, Judge
Rheinhart's opinion in the Ninth Circuit,8 6 was much more candid. He saw that if he was to get there, he could only do so by
means of establishing a general right of autonomy to control the
"time and manner" of a person's death,87 and then factor in a
balancing of the various interests. 88 But Judge Rheinhart never

acknowledged in his opinion that you could limit the right to
physician-assisted suicide to the self-administration by the individual, suffering patient, or that you can limit physician-assisted
suicide so that it stops at the line of surrogate decision-making.
The best way to illustrate this problem is through the Supreme
Court argument itself.8 9 Time and again, the plaintiffs could not
get away from these questions. I would say that of the hour allotted for their oral argument, they spent a full forty-five minutes
just trying to answer the question of how you can limit a physician-assisted suicide right just to the terminally ill at the end of
life. 90 If "mercy" is really the driving motivation, why does
83 See generally Respondent's Brief at *48-9, Quill (No. 95-1858) (arguing that distinction between terminal sedation and prescription of life-ending medication was irrational).
84 See Oral Argument at *55-7, Quill (No. 95-1858) (argument of Laurence Tribe).
85 See id. at *46 (Justice Scalia suggested that dilemma of physician-assisted suicide is
not as widespread among United States population as magnitude of litigation before Court
might otherwise suggest).
86 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
that "[a] competent terminally ill adult, having lived near the full measure of his life, has a
strong liberty interest in choosing a dignified and humane death"), rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
87 See id. at 816 (recognizing that there is no absolute, unfettered, concomitant right
to exercise liberty interest in all circumstances or completely free of state regulation).
88 See id. (stating that court must weigh and balance competing interests before making determination).
89 See generally Oral Argument at *3,Quill (No. 95-1858) (arguing that state should
avoid action when one citizen helps another to commit suicide).
90 See id. at *35 (asking Mr. Tribe whether young, healthy, despondent people also
have constitutional right to suicide).
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someone who has Lou Gehrig's disease and is going to spend the
next five years lying in a bed, perhaps only being able to move an
eyeball, and who wants to put an end to this, not have exactly
the same rights to "autonomy" as the person who has perhaps a
few hours or minutes to live?9 1 Doesn't the former person arguably have a better right to this, if we really consider physicianassisted suicide a fundamental liberty, than the person who is
just on their deathbed? Again, how about self-administration?
In her argument, Kathryn Tucker suggested that the only way to
avoid any mistakes in physician-assisted suicide would be
92
through "self-administration."
Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court was absolutely incredulous about this. Over and over they said asked "How can
that be? ' 9 3 Again, if someone is suffering so horribly, can the
mere fact that they cannot take the pill, that they can not selfadminister, limit it under the plaintiffs' own rationale?9 4 Indeed,
the same is true for surrogate decision-making. What if the person is incompetent and suffering horribly? What principled way
is that to limit this right? I think plaintiffs thought it was necessary to try to narrow the scope of the right and the rights associated with it to make it palatable, but the Supreme Court would
not have any of it. And that, I think, was a very vulnerable point
in their argument. And in the greater debate which now proceeds, we would all do well to acknowledge the fact that if we are
going to do this in a principled way, a purported right to physician-assisted suicide has to be much wider than the plaintiffs' in
these cases have defined it. It cannot narrowly be drawn just
from these few ideal cases outlined in the foregoing scenario.
This also hurt plaintiffs because it added a certain air of disingenuousness to their argument.
I would like to briefly point out some of the pitfalls and dangers with some of the physician-assisted suicide statutes that
have been proposed. The Oregon statute 9 5 which is now poised
91 See id. at *36 (arguing that it is agonizing suffering that gives people greater liberty
interest in deciding when to die).
92 See, e.g., Respondents Brief at *13, Quill (No. 95-1858) (noting that when withdrawal of life-sustaining respiration, food or water is involved, New York Court of Appeals
has recognized right of competent, terminally-ill patient to hasten his own death).
93 See Oral Argument at *55-6, Quill (No. 95-1858) (asking Mr. Tribe why liberty interest arrives only when death is imminent).
94 See id. at *35.
95 See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 et. seq. (1997) (passed by popular vote, November,
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to go into effect, for instance, contains no notification provisions
96 Neither the physician nor
whatsoever for an assisted suicide.
the patient are required to notify anyone that a physician97
assisted suicide is taking place. The patient can opt for notifi9 8 Nor is there a requirement
cation, but it is purely voluntary.
that a guardian of a ward be notified that a physician-assisted
suicide is taking place.
Second, the Oregon statute, and model statutes that have been
99
proposed in other state legislatures, afford a "good faith" criminal and civil immunity to the individual physicians who partici10 0 Normally, medical malpate in physician-assisted suicides.
1 1 There is a standard of care
practice is an objective standard.
intent, he can be
for physicians, and no matter what the doctor's
10 2 These statutes, howsued if he engages in substandard care.
10 3 In Oregon, a
ever, include an exception to this general rule.
a
state with an objective standard of care, there will thus be
one
unique statute which makes physician-assisted suicide the
instance in which the physician will not be held to an objective
10 4 There can be no civil liability or criminal
standard of care.
prosecution as long as the doctor subjectively was acting in good
faith. 10 5
I think it is very hard for plaintiffs and for physician assisted
1997).
96 See id.
written request
97 See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (1997) (proscribing who may initiate
see OR. REV. STAT. § 127.880 (1997) (providing that
for life-ending medication). toBut
127.897 shall be construed to authorize physician or any
"nothing in O.R.S. 127.800
or active euthanasia').
other person to end patient's life by lethal injection, mercy killing
for life-ending medirequest
of
form
forth
(setting
(1997)
127.897
§
STAT.
REV.
98 OR.
cation).
Issue, But Political
99 See Julie Forster, Legalizing Assisted-Suicide Still a Dead in 1996 WL 258752
'Taboo' has Been Lifted, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 5, 1996, available
suicide during 1995 and
(noting that sixteen states introduced bills to legalize assisted
1996).
Causes, Un100 See Giles R. Scofield, Symposium: Physician Assisted Suicide, Natural
L. REV. 317, 344
ENG.
NEW
W.
19
Alternative,
Restrictive
Least
the
and
natural Results,
remain presumably very
(1997) (arguing that doctors are clearly empowered while patients
vulnerable).
(It Dep't
101 See, e.g., Stanski v. Ezersky, 228 A.D. 311, 312, 644 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221
malpractice case).
1996)(enumerating those elements necessary for successful medical
102 See id.
103 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800 to 127.897.
with sui104 See id. (providing wide berth of legal immunity to physicians who assist
cide).
as physician complies
105 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.880 (1997) (stating that so long
killing or homimercy
suicide,
assisted
"suicide,
of
charges
no
be
can
there
with statute,
cide').
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suicide advocates to be arguing at one time that this right is going to be very carefully limited, while with the other hand advancing a legislative agenda of this sort. Again, the Supreme
Court has this material in front of them, and I do not believe
they will be blind to these issues.
Thank you very much.

